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Abstract
The paper performs a welfare comparison between demand deposit and equity contracts
in the presence of intrinsic aggregate uncertainty. In this framework, the welfare dominance
of deposit contracts emerges under corner preferences. It is shown that aggregate uncertainty
creates high price volatility of ex-dividend equity claims traded in a secondary market and the
resulting consumption allocations offer less risk-sharing opportunities to risk-averse consumers
than tailor-made deposit contracts. The contingency of early payoffs on depositors’ withdrawal
order reinforces the welfare performance of deposit contracts, whereas costly liquidation of
productive long-term investments deteriorates their welfare performance relative to equity con-
tracts.
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1. Introduction
Financial crises are an important reminder that fractional reserve banking systems are prone
to liquidity problems that can lead to periods of financial instability. Recently, central banks
and governments alike worldwide have followed both conventional and unconventional poli-
cies to enhance banks’ liquidity in order to restore public confidence.1 In performing the asset
transformation function, depository intermediaries raise funds by issuing debt contracts which
provide their holders the option to terminate the contract on demand at a pre-determined return,
in order to finance high yielding yet illiquid long-term investments. Due to the liquidity mis-
match in their balance sheet, depository intermediaries are prone to liquidity problems which
could lead to insolvency.2 This has raised questions regarding the performance of demand
deposit contracts in liquidity provision against alternative contractual forms.
It is well-established in the literature pioneered by Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) that demand deposit contracts improve on the competitive outcome by providing risk-
sharing opportunities against consumers’ private consumption contingencies, but the resulting
illiquidity of banks’ asset portfolio renders them vulnerable to runs.3 The present paper inves-
tigates the welfare performance of deposit contracts against the default-free equity contracts
introduced by Jacklin (1987). Examining the characteristics of the two contractual arrange-
ments in the presence of intrinsic aggregate uncertainty about the demand for liquidity, the
paper identifies cases where this friction imposes tighter constraints in the design of optimal
equity contracts which therefore can be dominated by a deposit banking structure.
The vulnerability of banks to default has attracted the attention of a strand of literature fo-
cusing on the design of deposit contracts that eliminate the bank run equilibrium when deposi-
tors are assumed to be sequentially served.4 An alternative run-proof contractual arrangement
is developed by Jacklin (1987) where intermediaries are entirely financed by issuing equity
rather than debt and permit the interim trading of equity claims. In a Diamond-Dybvig set-
1See Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010).
2For a comprehensive literature survey on the effects of liquidity shortages, see Tirole (2011).
3Policies that prevent or mitigate the effects of bank runs have been widely discussed in the literature. For a
review of the literature, see Gorton and Winton (2002).
4See Cooper and Ross (1998), McCulloch and Yu (1998), Green and Lin (2003), Peck and Shell (2003),
Andolfatto et al. (2007), Ennis and Keister (2009), Nosal and Wallace (2009), and Ennis and Keister (2011).
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ting where consumers have corner preferences such that they consume only once in their life-
time, tradable equity contracts are welfare dominant as they provide consumers with optimal
risk-sharing opportunities against idiosyncratic consumption shocks without the possibility of
default. However, when preferences are assumed to be smooth over time such that different
types of consumers have different valuation of consumption at different dates, the restriction
that characterises the design of equity contracts which imposes the same wealth to consumers
prior to trade in the secondary market, results in a welfare loss in comparison to tailor-made
deposit contracts’ allocations.5 Hence, the assumption of smooth preferences has been widely
adopted to justify the evident prominence of depository intermediaries in liquidity provision
relative to alternative arrangements.
The model developed in this paper highlights the role of intrinsic aggregate liquidity un-
certainty in the design of optimal financial contracts. Contrary to existing literature that relies
on the smooth preferences assumption to show the welfare dominance of deposit contracts, the
model demonstrates that when the aggregate demand for liquidity is not ex ante known, deposit
contracts can dominate in terms of welfare even under a more restrictive preference structure
such as corner preferences since they offer more liquidity insurance to risk-averse consumers.
This assumption on preferences is adopted to simplify the analysis. A more general prefer-
ence structure will only reinforce the welfare dominance of deposit contracts in the presence of
liquidity uncertainty.
In particular, it is assumed that the fraction of agents that want to consume early in their
lifespan is random, so that intermediaries can only make conjectures about the actual realisation
of the aggregate demand for liquidity from a known distribution when contracts are offered.
Therefore, contracts are incomplete as their interim payoffs are independent of the prevailing
state of the world and only second-best allocations are attainable. Specifically, deposit contracts
are liquidated on demand, providing consumers with the option to receive a pre-determined
interim payoff. In contrast, equity contracts provide a stream of payoffs and intermediaries are
restricted ex ante to commit to a level of investment in the underlying technologies as specified
by the contracts’ terms. Thus, equity contracts have a positive worth at the interim date that
5See Jacklin (1987), Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988), Haubrich and King (1990), and Alonso (1996).
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facilitates trade among different types of consumers in an ex post secondary market. Market
clearing ensures that the equilibrium market price reveals the state of the world so that interim
consumption is contingent on the realised demand for liquidity. Depending on the prevailing
state and the primitives of the model, two possible equilibrium configurations that can arise in
the ex post secondary market are identified.
The findings suggest that when liquidation of investment in the productive technology is
costless relative to storage, equity contracts could result in a greater welfare loss than deposit
contracts because they offer less liquidity insurance in the state of the world that is mostly
wanted by risk-averse consumers, and more liquidity insurance when it is least desirable. To
facilitate the comparison with the literature that sees bank fragility emanating from extrinsic
uncertainty when depositors are sequentially served, contingency of the deposit contracts’ in-
terim payoff on depositors’ withdrawal order reinforces their welfare dominance. However,
when investment in the productive technology is costly to liquidate, equity contracts can be-
come welfare dominant as equilibrium consumption allocations are independent of the liquida-
tion costs.
Although the paper focuses on the welfare analysis of financial intermediaries with differ-
ent capital structure, the results can also be extended to welfare comparison between alternative
channels of liquidity provision. The contractual arrangements considered in the paper can be
interpreted as depository intermediaries with mutual ownership that raise funds by issuing de-
posit contracts, and non-depository intermediaries that issue tradable equity claims such as
mutual funds. In contrast to the welfare evaluation in Qi (2003) who distinguishes between
monitoring banks and non-monitoring mutual funds in the presence of borrowers’ moral haz-
ard, the present paper does not impose any qualitative differences between these two types of
intermediaries.6 Alternatively, it can be viewed that liquidity is supplied in the economy in-
directly through depository intermediaries, or directly by trading of firms’ shares that have a
pre-determined dividend policy and access to the productive investments in the economy. As
6Departing from the welfare comparison between the two contractual forms, Gorton and Pennacchi (1990)
focus on intermediaries with mixed capital structure where both types of contracts are issued by the same interme-
diary (i.e. commercial banks). They demonstrate that, in equilibrium, informed consumers hold equity whereas
uninformed consumers hold debt as deposit contracts provide a mechanism to protect the latter from being ex-
ploited in the secondary market by coalitions of the informed consumers.
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such, the results of the paper provide a welfare evaluation of consumption allocations attainable
under different configurations of the financial system of an economy.7
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model and the bench-
mark case of full information. Section 3 analyses the optimal form of the demand deposit and
equity contracts. The welfare comparison of these two contracts is described in Section 4, and
conclusions are presented in Section 5. Proofs are provided in the Appendix.
2. The model
The banking environment in this model is based on Allen and Gale (2005) framework that
introduces uncertainty about consumers’ demand for liquidity in the Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) setup.
There is a single homogeneous commodity in the economy that can be used for consumption
and investment, and three dates indexed by t = 0, 1, 2. There is a continuum of measure one of
ex ante identical consumers born at date 0 with an endowment of one unit of the commodity,
and nothing thereafter. Consumers receive a privately observed liquidity shock at date 1 and
may become either impatient with probability π ∈ (0, 1), or patient with probability 1 − π.
Consumers are assumed to have corner preferences such that impatient consumers derive utility
only from the consumption of the commodity at date 1, whereas patient consumers only from
consumption at date 2. Expected utility is given by
V (C1, C2; π) = πU(C1) + (1− π)U(C2), (1)
where Ct denotes consumption at date t = 1, 2. The utility function U(Ct) is twice continu-
ously differentiable with U ′′(Ct) < 0 < U ′(Ct) and satisfies the Inada conditions.
Aggregate uncertainty is modelled by assuming that the preference shock π is a random
variable that takes two possible values 0 < πL < πH < 1 with respective probabilities q ∈ [0, 1]
and 1 − q. The distribution of the liquidity shock is common knowledge at date 0 and uncer-
tainty is resolved after consumption decisions have been made at date 1. The liquidity shock is
7For more information, see Allen and Gale (1995, 2000).
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independently and identically distributed across consumers so that, from the law of large num-
bers, π also represents the proportion of impatient consumers in the economy. Therefore, there
is ex ante uncertainty about the aggregate demand for liquidity as the fraction of consumers
who turn out to be either type is random.
There are two risk-free technologies available to all consumers in the economy. There is a
storage technology with a return of 1 unit at date t+1 for every unit of the commodity invested
at date t = 0, 1, and a long-term technology with a certain return of R > 1 units for every unit
of the commodity invested at date 0. If the long-term productive technology is interrupted at
date 1, it yields a return equal to the return from storage.8
As an alternative to the direct investment in the above technologies, consumers can use their
endowment to participate in contracts offered by financial intermediaries which are assumed to
have access to all the technologies described above. Free entry and competition among interme-
diaries force them to maximise consumers’ expected utility. Hence, without loss of generality,
the analysis focuses on the contractual relationship between consumers and a representative
financial intermediary. As the aggregate demand for liquidity is unknown when contracts are
designed, the representative intermediary offers incomplete contracts that provide a payoff at
date 1 that is independent of the state of the world, while date 2 payoffs exhaust its remaining
resources.
The representative intermediary can offer either a demand deposit or an equity contract to
the consumers at date 0 in return for their endowment,9 and is obliged to pay the amounts of
the commodity specified in the contract. However, depository intermediaries that offer liquidity
insurance to risk-averse consumers by issuing debt contracts are always subject to default when
publicly observable, but not contractible, variables (sunspots) coordinate depositors’ actions
to withdraw early. Focusing on the ex ante welfare performance of the two contracts in the
presence of intrinsic uncertainty, the possibility of bank runs is ignored.
8Note that the assumed weak dominance of the long-term investment’s return provides flexibility in the design
of debt contracts. If early liquidation is costly relative to storage, this will impose additional restrictions in the
optimal contract design and influence the welfare performance of the debt contract as discussed in the welfare
analysis in Section 4.
9This assumption removes the possibility of ex post arbitrage opportunities by trading in private markets so
that risk-sharing allocations provided by deposit contracts are incentive compatible. For further discussion on the
effects of side trades, see Haubrich and King (1990), Diamond (1997), Allen and Gale (2004b) and Farhi et al.
(2009).
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2.1. Full information
To facilitate the welfare comparison between the two contractual arrangements under in-
complete information, the benchmark full-information case is examined first, where the only
friction in the economy is the unobservability of consumers’ individual consumption prefer-
ences. Consider a social planner that invests consumers’ endowment in the underlying tech-
nologies on their behalf at date 0, and provides consumption allocations that maximise con-
sumers’ expected utility. The social planner is assumed to observe the state of the world at date
1 and before any consumption decision is made. As such, payoffs are contingent on the state
of the world and the social planner solves the following maximisation problem:
Problem 1.
max
{CS
1
,CS
2
}
qV
(
CH1 , C
H
2 ; π
H
)
+ (1− q)V
(
CL1 , C
L
2 ; π
L
) (2)
subject to the budget constraints:
πSCS1 = X
S at t = 1
(1− πS)CS2 = R
(
1−XS
)
at t = 2,
(3)
where S = H,L is the state of the world.
As the return from early liquidation of the productive technology is equal to the return
from storage, consumers’ endowment is fully invested long-term at date 0 and a proportion
XS ∈ (0, 1) is liquidated in order to meet the total demand for liquidity at date 1,10 while the
remainder comes to maturity in the next period and finances consumption at date 2.
Let the payoffs CS∗1 and CS
∗
2 be the solutions to the social planner’s problem that satisfy the
budget constraints and the first-order condition for each state
U ′(CS1 ) = RU
′(CS2 ). (4)
Similar to relevant literature, the coefficient of relative risk aversion is assumed to be greater
10This convention is adopted for simplification. In general, optimality requires that the proportion of consumers’
endowment kept in storage does not exceed the aggregate demand for liquidity at date 1 for either state. This is
discussed in Section 4 where the welfare effects of costly liquation of long-term investment are examined.
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than one as risk-averse consumers seek insurance against the event of becoming impatient and
forego the higher return of the productive technology. This assumption implies that any feasible
allocation which transfers consumption from date 2 to date 1 in relation to the autarkic outcome
leads to a Pareto-improvement in welfare.11 As such, 1 < CS∗1 < CS
∗
2 < R and consumers
self-select the payoff that is designed for their consumption profile. In particular, the social
optimum payoffs across the two states are related in the following way:
1 < CH
∗
1 < C
L∗
1 at t = 1
CH
∗
2 < C
L∗
2 < R at t = 2.
Note that XL∗ < XH∗ for the optimal risk-sharing allocation to be attained as a larger propor-
tion of the commodity needs to be liquidated to meet a greater demand for liquidity.
3. Intermediation under incomplete information
When the financial system is characterised by incomplete information, the state of the world
remains unknown prior to early withdrawals. Consequently, consumers are offered incom-
plete contracts in the sense that date 1 payoffs are non-contingent on the realisation of π.
The objective function of the welfare-maximising intermediary is identical to the one in the
full-information case, but depending on the contractual arrangement in question, different fea-
sibility and incentive constraints need to be introduced as individual consumption preferences
remain private information.
3.1. Demand deposit contract
Suppose that in return for consumers’ endowment at date 0, a bank is offering a demand
deposit contract that has the form {D1;DS2 } and provides consumers with the option to with-
draw a specified amount of the homogenous commodity at date 1 or date 2 denoted as D1 and
DS2 , respectively. The maximisation problem that the representative intermediary solves is:
11This assumption guarantees that CU ′(C) is decreasing in C, and therefore any feasible allocation such that
1 < C1 and C2 < R can attain a higher level of consumers’ expected utility than autarky.
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Problem 2.
max
{D1,DS2 }
qV
(
D1, D
H
2 ; π
H
)
+ (1− q) V
(
D1, D
L
2 ; π
L
)
subject to the budget constraints:
πSD1 = x
S at t = 1
(1− πS)DS2 = R
(
1− xS
)
at t = 2,
(5)
and the incentive compatibility constraint
U(D1) ≤ qU(D
H
2 ) + (1− q)U(D
L
2 ). (6)
By committing at date 0 to a fixed date 1 payoff, depending on the realisation of the state, let
xS ∈ [0, 1] be the proportion of the investment in the long-term technology that is liquidated
in order to meet the total demand for early withdrawals, while the rest remains invested until
date 2 and is used to finance late withdrawals. The incentive compatibility constraint given in
equation (6) ensures that patient consumers will not misrepresent their type and withdraw early
since the utility that they derive from storing for one period and consuming D1 at date 2, does
not exceed the expected utility they derive from withdrawing and consuming the payoff that is
designed for their type.
LetD∗1 andDS
∗
2 be the optimal payoffs that satisfy the constraints in the above maximisation
problem12 and the first-order condition
(
qπH + (1− q)πL
)
U ′ (D1)
qπHU ′ (DH2 ) + (1− q)π
LU ′ (DL2 )
= R. (7)
The following property summarises the comparative static effects of q.
Property 1. D∗1 is strictly decreasing in q, whereas DH
∗
2 and DL
∗
2 are strictly increasing in q.
The depositors’ expected utility is strictly decreasing and convex in q.
12Clearly, the incentive constraint is satisfied when D∗
1
< DH
∗
2
but this relationship depends on the functional
form of the utility and the parameters of the model. For simplicity, focusing on incentive-efficient allocations,
it is sufficient that the incentive constraint is monotonic in q when evaluated at the optimal payoffs. Since the
constraint is not binding when q = 0 and q = 1, this assumption guarantees that the constraint is satisfied with
strict inequality for any q.
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Proof. See Appendix
Note that when the state of the world is known with certainty (i.e. q = 0 or q = 1), equation
(7) becomes identical to the first-order condition in the social planner’s case. Therefore, from
the relationship between the social optimum and autarky allocations, the above property implies
that D∗1 > 1 and DH
∗
2 < D
L∗
2 < R.
3.2. Equity contract
An intermediary offers an equity contract to consumers at date 0 in return for their endow-
ment which is invested in the underlying technologies. As a convention, it is implicitly assumed
that the price of each contract is equal to one and also that contracts are infinitely divisible. The
equity contract gives consumers the right to receive two payments and has the form {δ1, δ2},
where δ1 = δ ∈ (0, 1) and δ2 = R(1 − δ) denote the dividend and the liquidating dividend
payments that consumers receive at date 1 and date 2, respectively.
A secondary market opens at date 1 that allows trade of ex-dividend claims to take place.
Having realised their individual consumption preferences, consumers have incentives to partic-
ipate in the market as they are entitled to receive an additional payment at the date that they
do not value consumption. Market forces determine the equilibrium market price which is,
therefore, dependent on the prevailing state of the world. Consequently, the final consumption
allocations attainable by the equity contract do not only depend on the terms of the contract,
but also on the market-clearing price in the secondary market, which in turn depends on the
realisation of π. Anticipating the equilibrium market price for each state of the world, the
intermediary selects δ to maximise consumers’ welfare.
In an attempt to provide a full description of the market forces that determine the attainable
allocations under an equity contract, consumers’ incentives to trade in the secondary market
are examined first. The consumption of impatient and patient consumers, denoted as CS1E and
CS2E respectively, will be:
CS1E = δ + p
S
CS2E =
(
1 + δ/pS
)
R(1− δ).
(8)
9
Impatient consumers are always willing to sell their ex-dividend equity contract at a price
pS > 0 since they can obtain additional utility of consumption at date 1. Therefore, the supply
of ex-dividend equity in the secondary market is perfectly inelastic and equal to the number of
impatient consumers, or QS = πS . In contrast, the demand for ex-dividend equity derives from
patient consumers who can use δ to buy additional δ/pS equity contracts when this provides
them with consumption at date 2 at least equal to the consumption that they could otherwise
achieve if they do not participate in the secondary market. Therefore, the demand for ex-
dividend equity is given by
QD =


(1− πS)δ/pS for pS ≤ R(1− δ)
0 for pS > R(1− δ).
That is, patient consumers are willing to buy additional ex-dividend equity contracts at date 1
only if the price they have to pay for each contract does not exceed its discounted return.
Trade in the secondary market determines the equilibrium market price pS∗, given by
pS
∗
=


(1− πS)δ/πS for δ ≤ δ˜S
R(1− δ) for δ > δ˜S,
(9)
where δ˜S = πSR/
(
πSR + 1− πS
) (so that δ˜L < δ˜H as πL < πH) denotes the threshold value
of δ for which the liquidating dividend payment is equal to the market-clearing price. Thus,
pS
∗ depends on δ and on the parameters of the model. When δ ≤ δ˜S , the market-clearing price
is equal to the ratio of the supply of the commodity by patient consumers to the supply of ex-
dividend equity by impatient consumers. When δ˜S < δ, the market-clearing price reaches its
ceiling value and is equal to the liquidating dividend.
The two possible equilibrium configurations that can arise in the secondary market are
represented in Figure 1 where the quantity and price of the equity contracts traded are measured
on the horizontal and vertical axis, respectively. The supply of equity is perfectly inelastic at πS ,
while the demand is initially horizontal at the price for which patient consumers are indifferent
to trade, up to the point where, given δ chosen by the intermediary, there are gains from trade
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and the demand becomes strictly decreasing and convex thereafter. If the market equilibrium
is located on the convex segment of the demand such as point A, there is a large number of
impatient consumers selling their ex-dividend claims and liquidity is therefore limited. This
puts a downward pressure on price and patient consumers receive a positive surplus as the cost
of buying additional ex-dividend equity is less than the discounted return of this investment.13
However, if the equilibrium is located on the horizontal segment of the demand, then liquidity
is plentiful and patient consumers do not derive any additional benefit from trading as the cost
of this investment opportunity is equal to its discounted reward.
Substituting for pS∗ into the consumption of the two types of consumers, the latter becomes
CS1E =


δ/πS for δ < δ˜S
δ +R(1− δ) for δ ≥ δ˜S
, and CS2E =


R(1−δ)
1−πS
for δ < δ˜S
δ +R(1− δ) for δ ≥ δ˜S.
(10)
Anticipating pS∗ , the intermediary selects the dividend payment δ∗ that maximises consumers’
expected utility. Let CS∗1E and CS
∗
2E denote the equilibrium consumption of impatient and patient
consumers, respectively. Note from equation (10) that in a given state, CS∗1E < CS
∗
2E for δ
∗
< δ˜S
and CS∗1E = CS
∗
2E for δ
∗
≥ δ˜S .
From these two plausible scenarios that may occur in the secondary market and the two
states of the world, the following lemma indicates that there are only two different regions
where δ∗ can lie, and therefore there are two possible configurations of the secondary market
that can arise in equilibrium.
Lemma 1. Depending on the specifications of the model, the dividend payment chosen by a
welfare-maximising intermediary will be either δ∗ < δ˜L, or δ˜L ≤ δ∗ < δ˜H .
Proof. See Appendix
Maximisation of consumers’ expected utility yields the first-order condition
qU ′(CH1E) + (1− q)U
′(CL1E)
qU ′(CH2E) + (1− q)U
′(CL2E)
= R, (11)
13In this case, the market-clearing price depends on the size of the liquidity shock. A similar relationship
between liquidity and asset prices, referred to as “cash-in-the-market pricing”, is identified by Allen and Gale
(2005) in examining how price fluctuations of illiquid assets traded in an interbank market exacerbate liquidity
shortfalls in the banking system.
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where CL∗1E < CL
∗
2E for δ
∗
< δ˜L, and CL
∗
1E = C
L∗
2E for δ˜L ≤ δ
∗
< δ˜H .
The relationship between consumers’ equilibrium consumption across the two states is such
that
CH
∗
1E < C
L∗
1E ≤ C
L∗
2E < C
H∗
2E (12)
and indicates that the equity contract offers more liquidity insurance to risk-averse consumers in
the low state as the dispersion between the equilibrium payoffs for the two types of consumers
is greater in the high state. This is due to the negative effect of πS on pS∗ which influences
the equilibrium consumption allocations. A high number of impatient consumers implies that
a greater quantity of ex-dividend equity contracts is supplied in the secondary market which
results in a low equilibrium market price. The consumption of impatient consumers falls since
they are forced to sell their equity claim at a low price, and the consumption of patient con-
sumers increases as they can buy a greater number of equity contracts using their dividend
payment to finance their consumption at date 2. In terms of Figure 1, an increase in the number
of impatient consumers can be represented by a shift of the convex segment of the demand to
the left and a rightward shift of the inelastic supply of equity contracts, resulting in a lower
market-clearing price.
The following comparative static property with respect to q provides a greater insight on
the welfare performance of the equity contract.
Property 2. For δ∗ < δ˜L, CS
∗
1E is strictly increasing in q and CS
∗
2E is strictly decreasing in q.
For δ˜L ≤ δ
∗
< δ˜H , C
L∗
1E becomes strictly decreasing in q (where CL
∗
1E = C
L∗
2E). The consumers’
expected utility is strictly decreasing and convex in q, for any δ∗ ∈ [XL∗ , XH∗ ].
Proof. See Appendix
Intuition behind the above property is provided in terms of δ∗ by noticing that δ∗ increases
with q. For δ∗ < δ˜L, an increase in δ
∗ has a positive direct effect on CS∗1E, and a positive
indirect effect through the resulting increase in the demand for ex-dividend claims which puts
an upward pressure on the market-clearing price. Due to the feasibility constraints and the
higher market-clearing price, both the direct and indirect effects on CS∗2E are negative. However,
for δ˜L ≤ δ
∗
< δ˜H , the positive direct effect of δ
∗
on CL
∗
1E is outweighed by the negative indirect
12
effect on the market-clearing price. When the demand is perfectly elastic, a rise in δ∗ results in
a lower return that patient consumers receive from purchasing additional equity claims which
puts a downward pressure on the equilibrium market price for patient consumers to participate
in the secondary market.
A unique threshold value of q can be identified from property 2, namely q˜, for which the
optimal configuration of the secondary market changes in the low state. Since q˜ is the threshold
value for which δ∗(q˜) = δ˜L and δ˜L is independent of q, from the first-order condition it follows
that
q˜ =
U ′(CL
∗
1E(δ˜L)) (R − 1)
U ′(CH
∗
1E (δ˜L))− U
′(CH
∗
2E (δ˜L)) + U
′(CL
∗
1E(δ˜L)) (R− 1)
,
where CL∗1E(δ˜L) = CL
∗
2E(δ˜L). Note that q˜ ∈ (0, 1] since CH
∗
1E (δ˜L) ≤ C
H∗
1 and CH
∗
2 ≤ C
H∗
2E (δ˜L)
as is discussed in Section 4.
For q ∈ [0, q˜) such that CS∗1 < CS
∗
2 , property 2 suggests that the equity contract provides
more liquidity insurance in both states for higher values of q. However, as the intermediary has
to commit to a fixed dividend payment at date 0, this results in more liquidity insurance than
what is socially optimal in the low state. Indeed, for q˜ ≤ q, the contract offers full insurance
against the risk of being impatient in the low state.
4. Welfare evaluation
The welfare analysis focuses on the restrictions that characterise each contract design as
in either case the intermediary maximises the same objective function but subject to differ-
ent constraints. From the sequential budget constraints, simplifying for the proportion of the
commodity liquidated at date 1 (i.e. XS , xS or d), all the feasible allocations satisfy the in-
tertemporal budget constraint
(1− πS)CS2 ≤ R(1− π
SCS1 ). (13)
The standard budget line-indifference curve approach provides a valuable insight on the welfare
performance of the two contractual arrangements.
Consider firstly the case where q ∈ [0, q˜) as illustrated in Figure 2. The budget lines for the
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two states of the world cross at the autarky allocation (1, R). Note that in order to simplify the
diagrammatic analysis, a homothetic utility function is considered such that income expansion
paths are represented as rays from the origin.14 The social optimum allocations are located at
the intersections between the two budget lines and the ray from the origin SO which captures
the fixed proportionality of the marginal utilities between the two types of consumers across
the two different states. For q = 0, the income expansion paths for the equity and deposit
contract coincide with the SO for the low state, and for the high state are represented by the
rays EC0 and DC0, respectively. Therefore, welfare dominance for values of q in the region
around zero, depends on which contract’s allocation lies on a higher indifference curve in the
high state. As q increases, properties 1 and 2 suggest that the income expansion paths of the
equity contract are rotating downwards, whereas the income expansion paths of the deposit
contract rotate upwards. In particular, when q = q˜, an additional condition is introduced in the
design of the optimal equity contract such that CL∗1E = CL
∗
2E . In terms of Figure 2, the income
expansion path of the equity contract in the low state is the 45 degrees line and the optimal
consumption allocation is now determined by the intersection of the 45 degrees line with the
corresponding budget constraint, represented by point FL.
For higher values of q such that q˜ < q ≤ 1, the allocation of the equity contract in the
low state does not satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint described in equation (13) with
equality. As CL∗1E is decreasing in q from property 2, higher values of q correspond to a move-
ment along the 45 degrees line in Figure 2 which leads to inferior allocations in the low state
inside the budget set. Finally, for q = 1, both contracts attain the social optimum allocation
for the high state as illustrated in Figure 3. The income expansion paths of both contracts co-
incide with that of the social optimum at SO, whereas for the low state they are represented
by the 45 degrees line and the ray from the origin DC1 for the equity and the deposit contract,
respectively. The equilibrium allocation of the equity contract lies on the bold segment of the
45 degrees line between points FL and FH .15
14This specification of the utility function is utilised only for illustrative purposes as the results of the model
hold for any utility function that satisfies the standard neoclassical properties with a coefficient of relative risk
aversion greater than one.
15Note that Figure 3 is drawn such that CH∗
2
exceeds the full-insurance payoffs in the low state indicated by
the point FL. In the case where CH
∗
2
is lower that the full-insurance payoffs in the low state, the allocation that
the equity contract can attain in the low state lies on the segment of the 45 degrees line above point FH but below
14
Evaluating the welfare performance of the two contracts, the following Proposition sum-
marises the main result of the paper.
Proposition 1. When q∗ ∈ (0, 1), the demand deposit contract ex ante dominates the equity
contract in terms of welfare for any q ∈ (q∗, 1), otherwise the deposit contract is welfare
optimal for any q ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. See Appendix
From properties 1 and 2, the proof of the above statement focuses on the comparison of the
slope of the optimal value function for each contractual arrangement at the limit cases where
the state of the world is known with certainty and is depicted in Figure 4 where the horizontal
and vertical axis measure q and consumers’ expected utility, respectively. It is shown that the
expected utility of the deposit contract EV ∗D is steeper than that of the equity contract EV
∗
E
when evaluated at q = 1. In terms of Figure 3, this implies that the allocation attained by
the deposit contract lies on a higher indifference curve than that of the equity contract for
q = 1. However, the slope of EV ∗D relative to EV
∗
E when evaluated at q = 0 depends on the
parameters of the model and on the functional form of utility. Numerical examples provided in
the Appendix show that both possibilities may arise. When EV ∗D is flatter than EV
∗
E at q = 0,
16
the deposit remains the dominant contract for any q ∈ (0, 1), where EV ∗D is represented by the
dashed line and EV ∗E by the bold line. In contrast, when EV
∗
D is steeper relative to EV
∗
E at
q = 0, a threshold value q∗ ∈ (0, 1) exists for which EV ∗D and EV
∗
E cross, so that the deposit
contract dominates for any q ∈ (q∗ , 1) as it is represented by the solid line.17
Further intuition on welfare dominance can be provided by examining the restrictions that
each contract imposes on the equilibrium allocations in relation to the benchmark allocations
under full information. In contrast to the social planner, a depository intermediary is con-
strained to provide a fixed payoff to impatient depositors while the level of liquidation of the
initial investment in the long-term technology is contingent on the prevailing state to meet the
aggregate demand for liquidity. Imposing on the social planner’s budget constraints that date 1
CH
∗
2
since piCH∗
1
+ (1− pi)CH
∗
2
< CH
∗
2
.
16In order to ensure that the optimal payoffs of the deposit contract are positive when evaluated at q = 0, the
model’s specifications should satisfy CL∗
1
< 1/piH .
17The relationship between the threshold values q˜ and q∗ depends on the parameter values and the utility func-
tion.
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payoffs are state-independent yields xL∗ < XL∗ < XH∗ < xH∗ . The relationship between the
optimal payoffs for any q ∈ (0, 1) is therefore:
CH
∗
1 < D
∗
1 < C
L∗
1 at t=1
DH
∗
2 < C
H∗
2 < C
L∗
2 < D
L∗
2 at t=2.
(14)
Although the contract eliminates the risk that impatient depositors face due to the uncertainty
about the aggregate demand for liquidity, this risk is borne by patient depositors as the fixed date
1 payoff results in a higher dispersion between date 2 payoffs relative to the social optimum
payoffs. In terms of the liquidity risk which can be captured by the dispersion between the
payoffs designed for each type of consumer for a given state, from the relationships described
in equation (14) it follows that the contract offers more risk-sharing in the high state than what
is socially desirable as DH∗2 − D
∗
1 < C
H∗
2 − C
H∗
1
18 and less risk-sharing in the low state as
CL
∗
2 − C
L∗
1 < D
L∗
2 −D
∗
1 .
19
In contrast, an equity contract provides individual consumers with two payments that are
independent of the state of the world; the dividend and the liquidated dividend available at date
1 and date 2, respectively. Contrary to the social planner, the intermediary must commit to a
fixed level of investment in order to meet its contractual obligations. Imposing the restriction
on the social planner’s budget constraints that the amount of the investment liquidated at date
1 is independent of the state yields XL∗ ≤ δ∗ ≤ XH∗ . The relationship between the optimal
consumption across states and for any q ∈ (0, 1) is therefore:
CH
∗
1E < C
H∗
1 < C
L∗
1 < C
L∗
1E at t=1(
CL
∗
1E ≤
)
CL
∗
2E < C
L∗
2 and CH
∗
2 < C
H∗
2E at t=2.
(15)
Depending on the realisation of the state, trade in the secondary market for ex-dividend eq-
uity determines the equilibrium consumption allocations. As indicated in equation (15), mar-
ket forces in the secondary market create a high dispersion between the equilibrium con-
18This relationship holds even when the utility function and the parameters of the model are such that DH∗
2
<
D
∗
1
.
19In the graphical representations in Figures 2 and 3 for a homothetic utility function, the risk-sharing perfor-
mance of the deposit contract is illustrated by the steepness of the income expansion paths relative to the social
optimum income expansion path where DH∗
2
/D
∗
1
< CH
∗
2
/CH
∗
1
and CL∗
2
/CL
∗
1
< DL
∗
2
/D
∗
1
.
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sumption for each type of consumer across states in relation to the corresponding social op-
timum consumption. In terms of liquidity risk, the equity contract offers less risk-sharing in
the high state and more risk-sharing in the low state than the social optimum allocations as
CH
∗
2 − C
H∗
1 < C
H∗
2E − C
H∗
1E and CL
∗
2 − C
L∗
1 > C
L∗
2E − C
L∗
1E .
20
Comparing the two contracts in terms of liquidity insurance, it is apparent that providing
consumers with state-independent consumption at date 1 is less restrictive than committing
to an investment policy when uncertainty is not resolved before payments are made. The ex
ante welfare dominance of the deposit contract arises from the fact that it offers more liquidity
insurance in the ‘bad’ state of the world (i.e. high state) than the equity contract since DH∗2 −
D
∗
1 < C
H∗
2 − C
H∗
1 < C
H∗
2E − C
H∗
1E , which is more valuable ex ante to risk-averse consumers.
However, the equity contract offers more liquidity insurance in the ‘good’ state of the world
(i.e. low state) than the deposit contract since CL∗2E − CL∗1E < CL∗2 − CL∗1 < DL∗2 − D∗1, which
is ex ante less valuable to risk-averse consumers. According to Proposition 1, this implies that
if the deposit is not already the optimal contract, it becomes the optimal one when the state of
the world is more likely to be high.
4.1. Sequential service constraint
Provision of liquidity insurance coupled with illiquid productive investments creates a liq-
uidity mismatch between banks’ liabilities and assets that explains their vulnerability to default.
Extrinsic uncertainty can result in an abnormal rise in early withdrawals and lead to liquidity
problems due to the fixed nature of banks’ liabilities. A common assumption in the relevant
literature that precludes the design of deposit contracts with contingent date 1 payoffs on the
total withdrawal demand is that intermediaries face a sequential service constraint such that
depositors are served on a first-come, first-served basis. Consequently, date 1 payoffs cannot
be contingent on the actual cumulative withdrawal requests and therefore are independent of
the order of depositors’ early withdrawals.21
While maintaining the view of banks’ vulnerability to default arising from exogenous
20Equivalently, in Figures 2 and 3, the steepness of equity contract’s income expansion paths for each state
relative to the social optimum expansion path is such that CH∗
2
/CH
∗
1
< CH
∗
2E
/CH
∗
1E
and CL∗
2
/CL
∗
1
> CL
∗
2E
/CL
∗
1E
.
21An extensive discussion on the role of the sequential service constraint to incomplete deposit contracts and
banks’ subjectability to default is provided by Ennis and Keister (2010).
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shocks, in the presence of aggregate liquidity uncertainty with a known prior distribution, the
state of the world can be inferred when a sequential service constraint is in place and this infor-
mation can be incorporated in the design of the deposit contract. When depositors are served
sequentially, the intermediary observes the state of the world after πL depositors are served as
any further early withdrawals will indicate a high demand for liquidity. Thus, a contract can be
designed such that date 1 payoffs are contingent on the random order in which depositors with-
draw. According to Wallace (1988, 1990), such contingency improves the welfare performance
of deposit contracts in the presence of aggregate uncertainty.
A representative bank offering such contingent deposit contract of the form {Dsc1;Dsc2}
solves the following maximisation problem:
Problem 3.
max
{Dsc1,D
s
c2}
q
[
πLU(DLc1) + (π
H − πL)U(DHc1) + (1− π
H)U(DHc2)
]
+ (1− q)V
(
DLc1, D
L
c2; π
L
)
subject to the budget constraints:
πLDLc1 = x
L
, for S = L
πLDLc1 + (π
H − πL)DHc1 = x
H
, for S = H
at t = 1
(1− πS)DSc2 = R(1− x
S) at t = 2
(16)
and the incentive compatibility constraint
q
(
πLU(DLc1) + (π
H − πL)U(DHc1)
)
+ (1− q)U(DLc1) ≤ qU(D
H
c2) + (1− q)U(D
L
c2). (17)
The contingent contract provides a payoff DLc1 to the first πL depositors who withdraw at
date 1 and DHc1 to the remaining πH − πL depositors when the state of the world turns out
to be high. According to the budget constraints in equation (16), a sufficient amount of the
commodity is liquidated to meet the demand for early withdrawals, while the remainder is used
to finance late withdrawals. The incentive compatibility constraint in equation (17) ensures that
patient depositors’ expected utility from withdrawing at date 1, storing their proceeds for one
period and consuming at date 2, does not exceed the expected utility that they derive by waiting
18
to withdraw at date 2.
Let DS∗c1 and DS
∗
c2 denote the payoffs that solve the bank’s maximisation problem and satisfy
the budget constraints and the first-order conditions
U ′(DHc1) = RU
′(DHc2),
U ′(DLc1) = R
(
qU ′(DHc2) + (1− q)U
′(DLc2)
)
.
(18)
To facilitate the welfare comparison with the standard (non-contingent) deposit contract, the
following property indicates that the optimal contract is incentive compatible and provides the
comparative static effect of q.
Property 3. The optimal contingent deposit contract is incentive compatible. DL∗c1 is strictly
decreasing in q, whereas DL∗c2 , DH
∗
c1 and DH
∗
c2 are strictly increasing in q. Depositors’ expected
utility is strictly decreasing and convex in q.
Proof. See Appendix
Note that when the state of the world is known with certainty, the contingent deposit con-
tract attains the social optimum allocation. Thus, from the above property it follows that for
any q ∈ (0, 1):
DH
∗
c1 < C
H∗
1 < D
L∗
c1 < C
L∗
1 at t=1
DH
∗
c2 < C
H∗
2 < C
L∗
2 < D
L∗
c2 at t=2.
The welfare implications of a sequential service constraint are summarised in the following
Proposition.
Proposition 2. When intermediaries are subject to a sequential service constraint, the welfare
performance of the deposit contract contingent on the depositors’ withdrawal order improves.
In relation to the equity contract, when q∗∗ ∈ (0, q∗), the contingent deposit contract ex ante
dominates the equity contract for any q ∈ (0, q∗∗), otherwise the contingent deposit contract is
welfare optimal for any q ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. See Appendix
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The above Proposition reproduces Wallace (1988, 1990)’s result that the contingency of
date 1 payoffs on the order with which withdrawals are made improves the welfare perfor-
mance of the deposit contract. This is because, contrary to the non-contingent contract, impa-
tient depositors share some of the uncertainty about the future state of the world with impatient
depositors, which results in a welfare improvement for the risk-averse consumers. As such, a
sequential service constraint enhances the welfare dominance of the deposit over equity con-
tracts.
4.2. Costly liquidation of productive technology
The assumed underlying technologies have an important role to play in the determination
of the optimal contract. The weak dominance of the productive long-term technology’s return
over storage makes investment decisions at date 0 trivial with regard to the uncertainty about
consumers’ demand for liquidity. Costless liquidation provides flexibility in the design of the
deposit contract as banks’ liquidity can be adjusted depending on the realisation of π. However,
if liquidation is costly relative to storage, ex ante investment decisions impose additional re-
strictions on the feasible allocations by a deposit contract, and consequently erodes its welfare
performance. In contrast, the welfare performance of the equity contract remains unaffected
because investment decisions are independent of the state of the world.
Specifically, let τ ∈ [0, 1) be the return from early liquidation. Since τ < 1 and R > 1,
it is ex ante optimal for the depository intermediary to invest a proportion y of the consumers’
endowment in storage to finance early withdrawals such that πLD1 ≤ y ≤ πHD1 and no
additional investment in storage takes place at date 1. Hence, the following budget constraints
should be satisfied:
πLD1 ≤ y
πHD1 = y + x
Hτ
at t = 1, and
(1− πL)DL2 = R(1− y) + y − π
LD1
(1− πH)DH2 = R(1− y − x
H).
at t = 2. (19)
Any excess amount of the commodity held at date 1 is reinvested for an additional period while
patient depositors receive the residue of investments at date 2. In contrast, an intermediary
offering an equity contract can satisfy its contractual obligations in each state without hold-
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ing excess liquidity and therefore can attain a higher level of welfare for low values of τ as
described in the Proposition below.
Proposition 3. The welfare performance of the deposit contract deteriorates as τ decreases
relative to the equity contract, where the latter is the dominant contract for τ = 0.
Clearly, the lower the return from liquidation, the greater the amount of commodity that has
to be invested in storage to meet early withdrawals, which in turn results in a fall of depositors’
expected utility.22 In particular, if investment in the productive technology is irreversible as
in Allen and Gale (2004a, 2005), an equity contract can attain superior allocations. Indeed,
feasible allocations in the high state satisfy the same intertemporal budget constraint for either
contract. In the low state, however, feasible allocations of the deposit contract satisfy the
intertemporal budget constraint
(1− πL)DL2 = R(1− π
HD1) + (π
H − πL)D1, (20)
which lies within the feasible set of allocations attainable by an equity contract for any q.23
Thus, consumers’ expected utility is maximised subject to tighter constraints and therefore the
equity contract is welfare dominant when τ = 0. The monotonicity of consumers’ expected
utility in terms of τ implies that equity becomes the welfare dominant contract when τ is low.
The intuition behind this result lies in the characteristics of the two contracts. Contrary to
the deposit contract, by providing another payoff at date 2, the ex-dividend equity contract has
a positive worth at date 1 as reflected by p∗ . Trade in the secondary market creates another
‘liquid’ asset between dates 1 and 2 that makes consumption allocations contingent on the state
of the world and independent of the return from liquidation.
Finally, it is important to highlight that the introduction of an interbank market that facil-
itates trade of claims in the irreversible productive technology at date 1 does not improve the
22Analytically, applying the Envelope theorem when a welfare maximising depository intermediary is facing
the budget constraints given in equation (19) yields ∂EV (V ∗(τ))/∂τ = qU ′(DH∗
2
(τ))R(piHD
∗
1
(τ) − y)/τ > 0
so that depositors’ expected utility is increasing in τ .
23Contrary to the budget lines for the two states described in equation (13) that cross each other at (1, R) as
illustrated in Figures 2 and 3, the budget line described by (20) crosses that of the high state at the 45 degrees line.
Hence, feasible allocations described by (20) also lie within the feasible set of allocations that can be attained in
the high state and consumers’ expected utility maximisation problem indicates that DL∗
2
< DH
∗
2
.
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welfare performance of the deposit contract in this framework. In the presence of intrinsic
aggregate uncertainty, Allen and Gale (2004a) show that when the liquidity shock does not
involve an idiosyncratic component which can be diversified through trading in the interbank
asset market, welfare-maximising banks remain autarkic.
5. Conclusions
The aim of the paper is to highlight the role of intrinsic aggregate uncertainty in the de-
sign of the optimal financial contracts by intermediaries. Two contractual arrangements are
compared in terms of ex ante welfare optimality; non-tradeable deposit contracts that can be
liquidated on demand, and equity contracts with a pre-determined stream of payments that can
be traded in an ex post secondary market. When uncertainty about the aggregate demand for
liquidity is not resolved at the time period financial contracts are designed and liquidation of
the productive technology is costless relative to storage, the results of the paper suggest that
deposit contracts can outperform equity contracts as social welfare is maximised subject to less
restrictive constraints. Specifically, it is shown that commitment to a pre-determined level of
investment in underlying technologies results in a greater welfare loss relative to the full in-
formation case than restricting date 1 consumption to be independent of the state of the world.
Liquidity uncertainty creates volatility on the equilibrium market price for ex-dividend equity
claims such that the equilibrium consumption allocations provide less liquidity insurance to
risk-averse consumers than deposit contracts. When a sequential service constraint is assumed
to be in place, date 1 payoffs become contingent on the order with which depositors are served,
improving the welfare performance of deposit contracts as aggregate risk is shared between the
two types of depositors.
The welfare analysis performed in this model utilises the standard neoclassical properties
of the utility function that represents consumers’ preferences for consumption at each date and
therefore the findings of the paper are independent of its functional form. Moreover, although
it is assumed that agents consume only once in their lifetime, the results obtained in this model
do not depend on the assumed preference structure. A more general preference structure will
only add to the complexity of the analysis without altering the main findings of the paper. In
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particular, if consumers are assumed to have smooth preferences, this assumption will only
reinforce the welfare dominance of the deposit contracts as shown in relevant literature.
However, extrinsic uncertainty and costly liquidation of the productive technology can have
a crucial effect on the welfare results. When uncertainty about the early withdrawal demand
is extrinsic, depository intermediaries that provide liquidity insurance are always prone to de-
fault since a bank run is another possible equilibrium in the post-deposit game between patient
consumers. In the absence of a safety net, taking the possibility of runs into account when
contracts are designed as in Cooper and Ross (1998), will create distortions on intermediaries’
asset portfolio that erode the welfare performance of deposit relative to equity contracts. This is
because, independent of whether the optimal deposit contract allows for one or multiple equi-
libria in the post-deposit game, a greater amount of the commodity is kept in storage to finance
early withdrawals as runs can occur with a positive probability. Moreover, costly liquidation
of investment in the productive technology also deteriorates the welfare performance of de-
posit contracts by restricting the set of feasible allocations as intermediaries need to adjust their
liquidity to meet the state-independent contractual obligations at date 1.
The model also provides an alternative approach to financial contracting when financial
fragility is viewed as the outcome of aggregate shocks to the demand for liquidity as in Allen
and Gale (2004a, 2005). When banks in liquidity distress can sell claims on irreversible pro-
ductive investments in an interim asset market, small liquidity shocks can propagate liquidity
shortages by dampening asset prices, causing isolated bank failures to become systemic. In
contrast, intermediaries financed by equity rather than debt are not ‘fragile’ as contractual obli-
gations are independent of the liquidity demand. The optimal configuration of the financial
system in the Allen and Gale (2004a, 2005) setting is an interesting topic for future research.
Acknowledgements
I am extremely grateful to Tim Worrall for his guidance and valuable input. I also wish to
acknowledge the participants in the research seminars at the Universities of Loughborough and
Sheffield for the useful and stimulating discussions. I would also like to thank Ike Mathur (the
editor) and an anonymous referee for the valuable feedback and insightful comments that were
23
provided.
24
Figures
Figure 1: Equilibria in the Secondary Market
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Figure 3: Equilibrium Allocations for q = 1
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Figure 4: Welfare Comparison of the Contracts
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A. Appendix
Proof of Property 1
Expressing the first-order condition in terms of D∗1 using the sequential budget constraints,
it follows that ∂D∗1/∂q = −∂2EVD(V
∗
)/∂q∂D
∗
1
/ (
∂2EVD(V
∗
)/∂D
∗2
1
)
, where EVD(V
∗
) =
qV H
∗
D + (1− q)V
L∗
D denotes the consumers’ ex ante expected utility at date 0 and V S
∗
D denotes
consumers’ expected utility in a given state as specified in equation (1). The denominator is
negative from the concavity of the utility function, while the numerator
∂2EVD(V
∗
)/∂q∂D
∗
1 = π
HπLR
(
U ′(DL
∗
2 )− U
′(DH
∗
2 )
)
/π < 0 (A.1)
is also negative since DH∗2 < DL
∗
2 from D
∗
1 > 1, where π = qπH + (1 − q)πL is the expected
value of π. Therefore ∂D∗1/∂q < 0, and from the feasibility constraints ∂DS
∗
2 /∂q > 0. Note
also that the monotonicity of D∗1 with respect to q implies that D
∗
1 ∈ (C
H∗
1 , C
L∗
1 ) for any
q ∈ (0, 1) and DH∗2 < CH
∗
2 < C
L∗
2 < D
L∗
2 from the feasibility constraints. Thus, from equation
(4) and the concavity of the utility function, the following relationships can be obtained:
U ′(D
∗
1)/U
′(DH
∗
2 ) < U
′(CH
∗
1 )/U
′(CH
∗
2 ) = R,
U ′(D
∗
1)/U
′(DL
∗
2 ) > U
′(CH
∗
1 )/U
′(CH
∗
2 ) = R.
(A.2)
Moreover, according to the Envelope theorem, the partial total derivative of EVD(V
∗
) with
respect to q is dEVD(V
∗
)/dq = ∂EVD(V
∗
)/∂q = V H
∗
D − V
L∗
D , where d2EVD(V
∗
)/dq2 =
∂D
∗
1/∂q
(
∂2EVD(V
∗
)/∂D
∗
1∂q
)
> 0 from equation (A.1) and Young’s theorem. Thus, in order
to prove that dEVD(V
∗
)/dq < 0 for any q ∈ [0, 1], it is sufficient to show that it is negative
when evaluated at q = 1 where
dEVD(V
∗
)
dq
∣∣∣
q=1
= (πH − πL)U(CH
∗
1 ) + (1− π
H)U(CH
∗
2 )− (1− π
L)U
(
R(1−πLCH
∗
1 )
1−πL
)
< (πH − πL)
(
U(CH
∗
1 )− U(C
H∗
2 )
)
.
(A.3)
The inequality derives from the relationship R(1 − πLCH∗1 )/(1− πL) > CH
∗
2 since CH
∗
1 > 1.
This implies that dEVD(V
∗
)/dq|q=1 < 0 as C
H∗
1 < C
H∗
2 . Thus, consumers’ expected utility is
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strictly decreasing and convex in q when the optimal deposit contract is offered. 
Proof of Lemma 1
The concavity of the utility function and linearity of consumption allocations with respect to
δ guarantee the existence of a unique dividend payment for each configuration that maximises
consumers’ expected utility. In particular, for the market configurations where δ < δ˜L and δ˜L ≤
δ < δ˜H , the optimal dividend payment in each case is an interior solution to the maximisation
problem. However, for δ˜H ≤ δ, the dividend payment that maximises consumers’ utility,
given in this case by U (δ +R(1− δ)), is the boundary solution δ˜H since dU/dδ < 0 for any
δ ∈ (0, 1). Hence, introducing the constraints on δ∗ for which each case is defined, consumers’
expected utility is maximised either for δ∗ < δ˜L or δ˜L ≤ δ
∗
< δ˜H . These cases constitute
possible equilibrium configurations of the secondary market depending on the parameters of
the model and the utility function. 
Proof of Property 2
Expressing the first-order condition in terms of CH∗1E , differentiation with respect to q for
δ
∗
< δ˜L yields
∂CH
∗
1E
∂q
= −
U ′(CH
∗
1E )− U
′(CL
∗
1E)− R
(
U ′(CH
∗
2E )− U
′(CL
∗
2E)
)
qU ′′(CH
∗
1E ) + (1− q)
πH
πL
U ′′(CL
∗
1E) + π
HR2
(
q
U ′′(CH
∗
2E
)
1−πH
+ (1− q)
U ′′(CL
∗
2E
)
1−πL
) > 0.
The above derivative is positive because the denominator is negative from the concavity of the
utility function, while the numerator is positive from the relationship between the equilibrium
payoffs given by equation (12) and the concavity of the utility function. Hence, for δ∗ < δ˜L,
∂CS
∗
1E/∂q > 0 and ∂CS
∗
2E/∂q < 0 from the feasibility constraints.
In a similar manner, for δ˜L ≤ δ
∗
< δ˜H , it follows that
∂CH
∗
1E
∂q
= −
U ′(CH
∗
1E )− U
′(CL
∗
1E)− R
(
U ′(CH
∗
2E )− U
′(CL
∗
1E)
)
qU ′′(CH
∗
1E ) + qR
2 πH
1−πH
U ′′(CH
∗
2E ) + (1− q)π
H(1− R)2U ′′(CL
∗
1E)
> 0
which is positive following similar reasoning as above. Hence, ∂CH∗1E /∂q > 0 and ∂CH
∗
2E /∂q <
0, whereas ∂CL∗1E/∂q = πH(1 − R)∂CH
∗
1E /∂q < 0 when δ˜L ≤ δ
∗
< δ˜H . This also implies that
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∂2EVE(V
∗
)/∂q∂CH
∗
1E > 0 for any q ∈ [0, 1].
According to the Envelope theorem dEVE(V
∗
)/dq = ∂EVE(V
∗
)/∂q = V H
∗
E −V
L∗
E , where
d2EVE(V
∗
)/dq2 =
(
∂2EVE(V
∗
)/∂CH
∗
1E ∂q
)
∂CH
∗
1E /∂q > 0 from Young’s theorem. Since
d2EVE(V
∗
)/dq2 > 0, evaluation at q˜ for δ∗ ≤ δ˜L yields
dEVE(V
∗
)
dq
∣∣∣
q=q˜
= πHU(CH
∗
1E (δ˜L)) + (1− π
H)U
(
R(1−πHCH
∗
1E
(δ˜L))
1−πH
)
−
U(πHCH
∗
1E (δ˜L) +R(1− π
HCH
∗
1E (δ˜L))) < 0
which is negative from Jensen’s inequality due to the strict concavity of the utility function, and
therefore, dEVE(V
∗
)/dq < 0 for any q ∈ [0, q˜).
Similarly, dEVE(V
∗
)/dq < 0 for δ˜L ≤ δ
∗
< δ˜H as
dEVE(V
∗
)
dq
= πHU(CH
∗
1E )+(1−π
H)U
(
R(1− πHCH
∗
1E )
1− πH
)
−U(πHCH
∗
1E +R(1−π
HCH
∗
1E )) < 0
from Jensen’s inequality due to the strict concavity of the utility function. Thus, the consumers’
expected utility is strictly decreasing and convex in q ∈ [0, 1] when the optimal equity contract
is offered. 
Proof of Proposition 1
Let ∆∗ED = EVE(V
∗
) − EVD(V
∗
) be the difference between the expected utility attained
under an equity and deposit contract, where d∆∗ED/dq = ∂EVE(V
∗
)/∂q − ∂EVD(V
∗
)/∂q the
partial total derivative with respect to q. From properties 1 and 2, ∂EV ∗/∂q = V H∗−V L∗ < 0
for either contract.
Evaluating the above difference at q = 1 yields d∆∗ED/dq
∣∣
q=1
= V L
∗
D (q = 1) − V
L∗
E (q =
1) as both contracts achieve the social optimum in state H . In state L (where q˜ < 1), the
equilibrium consumption of both types of consumers will be
CL
∗
2E(q = 1) = C
L∗
1E(q = 1) = π
HCH
∗
1 +R(1− π
HCH
∗
1 ) since δ
∗
= πHCH
∗
1 ,
D
∗
1(q = 1) = C
H∗
1 and DL
∗
2 (q = 1) =
R(1−πL CH
∗
1 )
1−πL
.
To prove that the deposit is the welfare dominant contract at q = 1, from properties 1 and 2 it is
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sufficient to show that d∆∗ED/dq
∣∣
q=1
> 0. Let πL = πH−ǫ, where ǫ > 0 a parameter. It can be
verified that d∆∗ED/dq
∣∣
q=1
is strictly increasing in ǫ. Since q˜ < 1, the model’s primitives should
satisfy CL∗1E(q = 1) ≤ R/(πLR+1−πL), or πL ≤ πHCH
∗
1 /C
L∗
1E(q = 1). Taking this condition
into account, note that limǫ→0+ d∆
∗
ED/dq
∣∣
q=1
= 0 and therefore, d∆∗ED/dq
∣∣
q=1
> 0 for any
ǫ > 0. Thus, EVE(V
∗
) < EVD(V
∗
) for values of q in the region around one as illustrated in
Figure 4.
Similarly, evaluation at q = 0 yields d∆∗ED/dq
∣∣
q=0
= V H
∗
E (q = 0) − V
H∗
D (q = 0). In this
case, the equilibrium consumption of both types of consumers for state H will be
CH
∗
1E (q = 0) = π
LCL
∗
1 /π
H , CH
∗
2E (q = 0) = R(1− π
LCL
∗
1 )/(1− π
H),
D
∗
1(q = 0) = C
L∗
1 and DH
∗
2 (q = 0) = R(1− π
H CL
∗
1 )/(1− π
H).
From properties 1 and 2, for the deposit to be the welfare dominant contract for values of q
in the region around 0 requires d∆∗ED/dq
∣∣
q=0
< 0. However, no positive conclusions can be
drawn about the sign of d∆∗ED/dq
∣∣
q=0
as this depends on the parameters of the model and the
functional form of the utility. This is illustrated with the use of numerical examples assuming a
constant relative risk aversion utility function of the form U(C) = C1−γ/(1− γ), where γ > 1
the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
From the first-order condition and the intertemporal budget constraint (equations (13) and
(4), respectively), it follows that CL∗1 = (πL + (1 − πL)R
1−γ
γ )−1. Suppose that γ = 2, πH =
0.7 and πL = 0.4. For R = 3.5, q˜ ≈ 0.47 and d∆∗ED/dq
∣∣
q=0
≈ 0.46 which implies that
V H
∗
E (q = 0) > V
H∗
D (q = 0). In terms of Figure 4 and from properties 1 and 2, this implies
that EVE(V
∗
) is flatter than EVD(V
∗
) at q = 0. In this case, EVD(V
∗
) < EVE(V
∗
) for
q ∈ (0, q
∗
) and EVE(V
∗
) < EVD(V
∗
) for q ∈ (q∗ , 1), where EV ∗D(V ) is represented by the
solid line. In terms of Figure 2, the equity contract’s allocation in state H lies on a higher
indifference curve than that attained by the deposit contract. However, for R = 2, q˜ ≈ 0.26
and d∆∗ED/dq
∣∣
q=0
≈ −0.22 which implies V H∗E (q = 0) < V H
∗
D (q = 0). Hence, EVE(V
∗
)
is steeper than EVD(V
∗
) at q = 0 in Figure 4 and therefore EVE(V
∗
) < EVD(V
∗
) for any
q ∈ (0, 1), where EVD(V
∗
) is represented by the dashed line. In this case, the equity contract’s
allocation lies on a lower indifference curve in Figure 2. 
30
Proof of Property 3
Using the sequential budget constraints to express the first-order conditions in terms of DH∗c1
and DL∗c1 , differentiating with respect to q yields
∂DL
∗
c1
∂q
=
R
(
U ′(DH
∗
c2 )− U
′(DL
∗
c2 )
)
U ′′(DL
∗
c1 ) + π
LR2
[
qU ′′(DH
∗
c2 )U
′′(DH
∗
c1 )
(1−πH )U ′′(DH
∗
c1 )+(π
H−πL)R2U ′′(DH
∗
c2 )
+
(1−q)U ′′(DL
∗
c2 )
(1−πL)
] < 0,
since DH∗c2 < DL
∗
c2 and from the concavity of the utility function.
To prove that the optimal contingent deposit contract is incentive compatible, it is sufficient
to show that ICcH = πLU(DL
∗
c1 )+(π
H−πL)U(DH
∗
c1 )−U(D
H∗
c2 ) ≤ 0 since DL
∗
c1 < D
L∗
c2 . Given
that DH∗c1 < DL
∗
c1 , let DH
∗
c1 = D
L∗
c1 − ε where ε > 0 is a parameter. Differentiating ICcH(ε)
with respect to ε yields ∂ICcH(ε)/∂ε = −
(
U ′(DH
∗
c1 ) +RU
′(DH
∗
c2 )
)
(πH−πL)/(1−πH) < 0.
Therefore, as limε→0+ ICcH(ε) = πHU(DH
∗
c1 ) − U(R(1 − π
HDH
∗
c1 )/(1 − π
H)) < 0 from the
first-order condition, it follows that ICcH(ε) < 0 for any ε > 0. Hence, the optimal payoffs
of a contingent deposit contract satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint given in equation
(17).
Differentiating dEVC(V
∗
) twice with respect to q, where dEVC(V
∗
)/dq = V H
∗
C − V
L∗
C
from the Envelope theorem, yields
dEVC(V
∗
)/dq = (πH − πL)U(DH
∗
c1 ) + (1− π
H)U(DH
∗
c2 )− (1− π
L)U(DL
∗
c2 ),
d2EVC(V
∗
)/dq2 = πLR
(
U ′(DL
∗
c2 )− U
′(DH
∗
c2 )
)
∂DL
∗
c1 /∂q > 0.
The sign of the second derivative is positive as DH∗c2 < DL
∗
c2 and ∂DL
∗
c1 /∂q < 0. To prove that
dEV
∗
C(V )/dq < 0 for any q ∈ [0, 1], it is sufficient to show that dEVC(V
∗
)/dq
∣∣
q=1
< 0. From
the first-order condition in each state note that DL∗c1 (q = 1) = DH
∗
c1 (q = 1). Therefore, the
deposit contract attains the social optimum allocation in in state H as DL∗c1 (q = 1) = DH
∗
c1 (q =
1) = CH
∗
1 and DH
∗
c2 (q = 1) = C
H∗
2 , whereas DL
∗
c2 (q = 1) = R(1− π
LCH
∗
1 )/(1− π
L). Notice,
however, that dEVC(V
∗
)/dq
∣∣
q=1
= dEVD(V
∗
)/dq
∣∣
q=1
(equation (A.3)) which has been shown
to be negative. Hence, consumers’ expected utility is strictly decreasing and convex in q when
the optimal deposit contract with contingent date 1 payoffs is offered. 
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Proof of Proposition 2
Similar to the proof of Proposition 1, let ∆∗CD = EVC(V
∗
) − EVD(V
∗
) be the difference
between the expected utility attained by deposit contracts with contingent and fixed date 1
payoffs.
In the proof of property 3, it has been shown that dEVC(V
∗
)/dq
∣∣
q=1
= dEVD(V
∗
)/dq
∣∣
q=1
.
Hence, d∆∗CD/dq
∣∣
q=1
= 0 so that EVC(V
∗
) and EVD(V
∗
) are tangent at q = 1. Properties 1
and 3 imply that the welfare dominant contract for any q ∈ (0, 1) is the one that dominates in
the region of q around zero. For q = 0, both contracts attain the social optimum allocation in
state L, whereas the equilibrium consumption of both types of consumers in state H are
DH
∗
c2 (q = 0) = R
(
1− πLC
L∗
1 − (π
H − πL)DH
∗
c1 (q = 0)
)
/(1− πH),
D
∗
1(q = 0) = C
L∗
1 , and DH
∗
2 (q = 0) = R(1− π
HCL
∗
1 )/(1− π
H).
Hence, d∆CD/dq|q=0 will be
d∆CD
dq
∣∣∣
q=0
= (πH − πL)
(
U(DH
∗
c1 (q = 0))− U(C
L∗
1 )
)
+(1− πH)
(
U(DH
∗
c2 (q = 0))− U(D
H∗
2 (q = 0))
)
.
Since DH∗1 (q = 0) < CL
∗
1 , let the parameter e > 0 be such that CL
∗
1 = D
H∗
c1 (q = 0) + e.
Differentiation of d∆∗CD/dq
∣∣
q=0
with respect to e provides
∂
(
d∆
∗
CD/dq
∣∣
q=0
)
∂e
= −(πH − πL)U ′(CL
∗
1 )− π
LRU ′(DH
∗
c2 (q = 0)) + π
HRU ′(DH
∗
2 (q = 0))
> (πH − πL)R
(
U ′(DH
∗
2 (q = 0))− U
′(CL
∗
2 )
)
,
where the inequality derives from the relationship DH∗2 (q = 0) < DH
∗
c2 (q = 0), the first-order
condition of the social planner’s problem for state L and the concavity of the utility function.
Hence, the above derivative is positive since DH∗2 (q = 0) < CL
∗
2 . Taking the limit as e tends to
zero it follows that lime→0+ d∆CD/dq|q=0 = 0, and therefore d∆CD/dq|q=0 > 0 for any e > 0.
This implies that EVC(V
∗
) is flatter than EVD(V
∗
) for values of q in the region around zero,
and consequently EVD(V
∗
) < EVC(V
∗
) for any q ∈ (0, 1).
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Although the welfare performance of the deposit contract with a sequential service con-
straint is improved, the equity contract can still dominate for low values of q depending on
the primitives of the model and the assumed utility function. From the discussion in the proof
of Proposition 1, the contingent deposit contract dominates for high values of q in the region
around one. The monotonicity of EVE(V
∗
) and EVC(V
∗
) with respect to q suggests that if
EVC(V
∗
) < EVE(V
∗
) for values of q in the region around zero, then a threshold value of q
exists, namely q∗∗ ∈ (0, q∗), such that EVC(V
∗
) < EVE(V
∗
) for any q ∈ (0, q∗∗). Otherwise,
EVE(V
∗
) < EVC(V
∗
) for any q ∈ (0, 1).
Consider the utility function and the parameters’ values in the example provided in the
proof of Proposition 1. It has been shown that the equity contract initially dominates the
deposit contract with fixed date 1 payoff for γ = 2, πH = 0.7, πL = 0.4 and R = 3.5.
Let ∆∗EC = EVE(V
∗
) − EVC(V
∗
) be the difference between the expected utility attained
under an equity and contingent deposit contract. For the same specification of the model’s
parameters, d∆∗EC/dq
∣∣
q=0
≈ −0.18 which implies that EVC(V
∗
) is flatter than EVE(V
∗
) at
q = 0, and therefore EVE(V
∗
) < EVC(V
∗
) for any q ∈ (0, 1). Suppose now that γ = 5,
πH = 0.7, πL = 0.6 and R = 9. For these values of the model’s parameters q˜ ≈ 0.8
and d∆∗EC/dq
∣∣
q=0
≈ 0.14. In this case, EVC(V
∗
) is steeper than EVE(V
∗
) at q = 0 and
EVC(V
∗
) < EVE(V
∗
) for q ∈ (0, q∗∗), whereas EVE(V
∗
) < EVC(V
∗
) for q ∈ (q∗∗ , 1). 
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